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CRIMINAL Law is something more than a body of rules to be learned by
rote, continually modified, enlarged or diminished by the often contradictory
interpretations of the courts. To the perfunctory beholder it may appear as
a static magnitude, devised by the wisest of men, endorsed by the ages and
applied by learned judicial specialists who are guided by the so-called average
conscience. Unswerving in their objectivity, these judges extract the Truth
from carefully gathered and presented evidence. This is the ideal - not to
be found outside the fictions of those pious epochs wherein the ordeal revealed
the judgment of an unerring deity. Then, there was no contradiction of experts,
no equivocal reading of the lie detector. But that "golden age" is gone and
now we have to settle for man-made criminal law and the deficiencies of a
process where "to err is human."
We cannot, of course, teach introductory criminal law without resort to
the pedagogical artifice of simplification, nor should we lift too early the
curtain behind which the intricacies lie in ambush. Yet neither should we
send the law student into the professional world without a foretaste of the
puzzling problems that will confront and confuse him throughout his career .
Without this mindful initiation he is apt to quiet his conscience, to come to
arrangements with reality and to grow cynical, although life, honor and prop-
erty are given in his charge. Whoever would permit the rising generation of
legal minds to fall into complacency, routine and hardness of heart would
inflict injury on his fellow beings and himself.
The volume under review is a bold and stimulating effort to counter the
stagnation toward which the legal mind is tempted. Science and technology
persist in remodeling the world about us, creating new potentialities for col-
liding interests and conflicting demands - and new types of crimes and
criminals. Old customs and taboos are growing "unseaworthy"; what was
once a breach of law may now be only a breach of morals or a break with
conformity. Parts of the criminal law are ripe for reconsideration and re-
working. How can we modify our insufficient therapy unless we know the
nature of the new phenomena of life and the significance of their implications?
This brings us to the substance of this bulky, yet lucidly ordered, book. I
approve of the variety of unorthodox approaches the authors use to make
their points. In a chapter dealing with the differences between civil and crimi-
nal law consider, for example, their use of Samuel Butler's satirical parody,
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in which a man is accused of the crime of "pulmonary consumption," to illus-
trate, by comparison, the ambivalence of modern laws governing tuberculars.1
After the judge admirably sums up, the jury retires for not more than ten
minutes and the foreman returns with a verdict of "guilty." The "felon" has
a police record, having led a "career of crime." He had been convicted earlier
of -"aggravated bronchitis" and on no less than fourteen occasions "for ill-
nesses of a more or less hateful character." One is tempted to smile until
confronted in the succeeding pages of Criminal Law with the Florida statute
providing for compulsory confinement in Tuberculosis Hospital.
The section on sanctions,2 including discussion of the use of force by police,
the problems of capital punishment, confinement and parole, covers material
which is ordinarily excluded from the study of criminal law, although they
are important links in the chain of its operation. Problems widely scattered
in the systematic treatises on criminal law are collected in this volume under
the heading: "What Provoking Events Negate or Mitigate What Crimes ?"
Here, attention is given to such seemingly diverse topics as police entrapment,
killing of "ghosts" by superstitious people, manslaughter and provocation,
and brainwashing.
The most impressive part of this book is the material which constitutes the
Dr. Martin case.3 Dr. Martin was a pediatrician accused of performing homo-
sexual acts upon the disturbed children who were his patients; he sought to
defend these acts as therapeutic; offering as evidence his substantial success in
cases where more conventional treatment had failed. The treatment of the case
is a brilliant introduction to the criminal process, drawing, as it does, upon
sociology, psychology, psychiatry and statistics to erect a solid basis for the
study. None of -the forces set in motion by the respected Doctor's deviation
from accepted professional and social paths is omitted: the case is traced from
the complaining citizen, through prosecutor's information, newspaper reports,
pleas, trial, conviction, public reaction, confinement and parole.
The long story is followed by a rewarding discussion of the homosexual
issue. The authors collect the results of legislative and medical investigations,
remarks of homosexuals and professional blackmailers together with the well
known Wolfenden Report of 1957. I might add here, that the art of the de-
fense and criminal statistics could be given greater consideration - minor
deficiencies which could be corrected in future editions.
In conclusion, I would not suggest that the abbreviated way of teaching
criminal law has lost its use; but I d6 believe that this new approach to the
rules and statutes, studied against the background of changing human needs,
technological transformations and fluctuating social consensus and prejudice,






pared, our young lawyers should enter the clock-work of society better
equipped to carry out their important function in the face of increasing
complications.
HANS VON HENTIGt
THE. work published by Professors Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz is
of such novelty and remarkable interest that it is necessary to examine the
extent of their enterprise. I should say that I embrace this task not only as a
criminal lawyer with a Latin and continental background, but also as a com-
parative lawyer who is striving to go beyond his first training in order to
become familiar with the great currents of modem criminal policy.
From this double point of view, the importance of Criminal Law is readily
apparent. The authors have had the desire to do something new, the care to
present all points of view and the imaginaton to present new perspectives.
They exhibit a will to make comprehensible that which exists and that which
could exist. Yet while one is struck by the novelty and even the audacity of
this undertaking, it is clear that the authors do not try to present a doctrine,
but to suggest a method of study, and it is primarily for that, that their effort
deserves attention. We must content ourselves here with a few reflections,
first on the basic conceptions of the authors, then on their method, and finally
on the concrete execution of concept and method.
Three basic conceptions appear to underlie the entire work. Unlike so
many lawyers who view criminal law as a kind of technique, Donnelly, Gold-
stein and Schwartz believe that criminal law constitutes a true science and
should be treated as such. Furthermore, it is a social science: a procedure
for the control of human behaviour. Thus it constitutes a social phenomenon
in itself and cannot be considered as a mere logical ensemble of abstract rules
or commandments. Finally, this science of criminal law is only one of many
interrelated social sciences.
We consider two consequences of these basic conceptions to be especially
significant. First, the authors react against the isolationism of classical penal
law - the view that the separate domains of each social science can be isolated
and examined without reference to the others. They attempt to demonstrate
in the most persuasive way the bonds which unite penal law to other great
disciplines, specially to sociology. One could almost say that the work is as
valuable for the training of sociologists as for the training of lawyers. This
view of criminal law is both broad and flexible, and, in our opinion, singu-
larly exalting.
Secondly, these basic conceptions result in the constitution, or the recon-
stitution, of a multi-disciplinary criminal science. For a quarter of a century
tProfessor Emeritus, University of Bonn.
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there have been ardent debates over the relation of penal law and criminology
to each other. Lawyers with a classical background have tended to ignore
criminologists, and have in turn been ignored by them. The authors have
indicated the relations between the neighboring disciplines of criminology,
penal law, penology, and criminal policy without attempting to impose any
kind of hierarchy on them.
The method by which Professors Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz have
chosen to study penal law reflects their concern for the living law, that is, ap-
plied criminal law. They devote much attention to the "decision maker," and
the concrete problems with which he is confronted.
We would have'to discuss the entire table of contents point by point to
give a complete picture of the broad range of questions treated. Suffice it
to say that the selection is extremely rich and varied. However, there are
eight fundamental questions which the authors consider particularly impor-
tant.1 "If the law is a method of social c6ntrol, what goals should be attributed
to if? What special functiont is to be assigned to criminal law, and what means
can be furnished to achieve' these ends? One must also determine what situa-
tions'or acts can be designated "criminal" and what consequences should be
officially drawn from such a designation. But who will have the qualifications
to pose and resolve these questions of method and designation? It is also
necessary to consider to what extent conditions such as culture, race, family,
and physical or social state should be taken into account in defining the crime.
'What elements or what acts will serve to justify acts committed or diminish
their criminal character? Finally, on the level of criminal policy, what data
are-at the disposal of the'decision maker, whether he is the legislator formu-
lating penal rules or the judge applying them, or the parole board which in
practice determines the length of sentences.
This framewiork explains the choice of materials treated and their distribu-
'tion into three essential chapters. The second chapter is particularly rich. All
aspects of the legislative and procedural problems are treated, leading up to a
' uestioning of the nature, scope and legitimacy of a penal code, and the social,
human, and moral nature of crime. The authors also explore the legal defini-
-tion of'crimes and the need for such definitions, the nature and goals of the
penal sancdtion and its application in particular circumstances. In the third
chapter the authors make a new and particularly interesting effort to examine
criminal law in relation to social groups and the influences these groups have
ofn our conceptions of penal responsibility and the definition of crime.
- One realizes the novelty of this work when one examines the types of ma-
'terials selected. The authors attempt to include materials which will shed
light'on 'all- of the relevant issues and points of view in the discussion of
each of the questions they have chosen. One finds the texts of essential statutes,
the principal cases, the opinions of scholars in the various social sciences,




give an accurate picture of the penal process in action. On occasion even state-
ments which purport to be representative of public opinion are presented.
Such diversity threatens to present a grave danger, that of dispersion. The
reader might become lost in the mass of readings provided. However, the
authors have been skillful in selecting materials that will interest and hold
his attention. Certain striking selections are arranged to illustrate both the
concrete case under discussion and the theoretical problem to be resolved. No
effort was made to reach easy solutions or to oversimplify the problems; the
authors require of the reader a constant effort of reflection and assimilation.
The presentation of the case of Dr. Martin illustrates this method. 2 This
affair is followed in all of its developments, from the small local scandal.which
originated it, to its complicated legal, sociological, medical and criminological
ramifications. At each step the authors show that there was a responsibility
to be taken, and each decision is subjected to a serious critical examination.
We turn now to examine the presentation of the basic conceptions and
scientific method. In a work whose greatest value is its originality, it is not
surprising that the critical reader may, from time to time, differ with the au-
thors. First, however, let us point out some of the great advantages of this
presentation.
As we have mentioned, the authors are particularly concerned with the de-
cision maker and have presented him in the different situations in which he
must formulate or apply penal law. They examine in turn the case of the
legislator, the judge, the expert, the legal commentator, and the sociologist
confronted with the same problem. This multiple exposure is original and
conforms to the basic conceptions of the book. Another virtue is the concrete
method of exposition utilized. Nearly 250 pages are devoted to the Martin
case, which confronts the reader with criminal law in action. In the same way,
the Garcia case is discussed in all its complexity along with its ramifications
on the doctrinal level and with respect to penological experiments.3 In con-
nection with the discussion of the insanity defense, it is good to see the
M'Naghten case of 1843 reproduced in its entirety 4 instead of merely cited
for its famous rule. Such thorough treatment of complex cases is very helpful
for the law student.
The authors present an exhaustive, precise, -and lively analysis of such
diverse doctrines as the voluntary character of the incriminating action, the
notion of an act as opposed to a state of being, and the sanction of the depri-
vation of liberty. They deserve congratulation for their daring in putting
into issue problems which criminal lawyers have a tendency to consider settled
once and for all. For example, they ask whether a system of criminal law is
indispensable or even necessary and if it is really possible and useful to define





THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
century, and whether it should be a code of crime, of punishment, a system of
rehabilitation, or a code of some other nature. They examine the how and why
of penal law in the light of diverse experiments. Criminal science and criminal
policy will undoubtedly gain in scope and efficacy if they dare to reExamine
these problems that the old dogmatic statements are no longer adequate to
resolve.
The personal position of the authors is another excellent feature of this
work. Although one is always conscious of their presence in the demonstrations
and discussions, they retain a certain anonymity in that they never seek to
propose, or still less to impose, a doctrine on the reader. In this respect the
work may be more useful for the experienced criminal lawyer than for the
law student.
Criminal Law was a task undoubtedly too large to be fully realized and yet
in a work that attempts to explore every aspect of criminal problems, certain
omissions appear regrettable. For example, Professors Donnelly, Goldstein
and Schwartz indicate in their introduction that they do not intend to dis-
cuss delinquents as a unique classification. To some extent they even con-
sider a mode of analysis based in such distinctions as obsolete, or as tending
to give an inexact picture of criminal problems. We concede that in the first
half of this century criminal typology was abused. Nevertheless, to exclude
the problem from a work which seems to be complete is to expose it to nu-
merous criticisms. From Lombroso to M. di Tullio, considerable efforts have
been made to classify delinquents. From Dinberg to Sutherland other attempts
have been made to provide criteria for these classifications from different
perspectives. It seems unfortunate that the problem should be deliberately
neglected here.
Further, although the authors have striven to reconsider penal law from
the standpoint of social groups, it must be recognized that their third chapter
dealing with the problem is less satisfying than the other two. The material
presented is interesting enough, but it seems to defy examination. Whether
because of lack of time or a sense of the relative unimportance of the topic,
the problems seem to be less thoroughly grasped than those in Chapter II.
On still other matters it is surprising that the authors, so disposed to com-
plete developments, seem brusquely to limit themselves to rather superficial
indications. For example, the presumption that the accused is innocent until
proved guilty is noted only by a simple reference, a quotation from Bentham 5
which far from exhausts the question. For Bentham, the presumption was a
question of common sense and a simple direction to the judge. He even seems
to have had some hesitation about that. Now, there is no doubt that this
principle dominates the penal process, at least in the Western systems. But
it does not consist of a merely simple statement of judicial psychology, and
it is not presented in the same way in procedural systems which recognize or
5. Pp. 268-69.
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do not recognize the institution of the examining magistrate (juge d'instruc-
tion). Furthermore, one can either conceive of the presumption as a simple
rule of proof or make of it a principle of general public law which dominates
the entire penal process. That is a question on which fuller exposition would
have been desirable.
Another example of a significant omission relates to the problem posed in
Chapter II, part 7: Is it really necessary to define the crime?6 Twenty or
thirty years ago this problem was extremely controversial, and certain people
at the time proposed incrimination by analogy. It is curious that the authors
include only one unusual treatment of the subject relating to the old free
city of Danzig.7 We think it would have been more useful to contrast Article
16 of the Soviet Penal Code of 1926 with the National Socialist Law of 1935,
and then to ask whether there could not be still a third type which was more
compatible with the principles of Western law, such as that authorized by the
Danish Penal Code of 1930. It is particularly important for countries in the
English legal tradition to be aware of the possibilities in this area since they
must deal with the problem of the recognition of common law crimes. And
wouldn't it have been more useful to insist more upon the differences which
may exist between American, Canadian, or Australian law and modern
English cases?
Another subject which has been given unduly hasty treatment- relates to
the sanction of deprivation of liberty. The discussion of prison methods ap-
pears rather thin considering the attention the subject has received recently
from criminologists.
Finally, the authors have recognized the need for comparative studies but
they have undertaken them in a sporadic fashion and the selection of materials
is occasionally dubious. With respect to the function of punishment, the authors
were right to include the text of the Yugoslavian Penal Code of 1951 8 al-
though it was revised in 1959. However, they also include a Puerto Rican
project 9 which is perhaps of special interest to American readers, but whose
import is rather limited. Similarly they have included the law of 1958 on the
fundamental principles of Soviet penal legislation, ° but without the comple-
mentary materials needed to give an accurate picture of the context and
socio-economic milieu in which the Soviet laws operate.
In general, the authors have too easily ignored the point of view known
in Europe as la politique criminelle. This problem of criminal policy underlies
the entire work, and an adequate treatment of the subject would do much to
clarify the new perspectives that the authors give. A future lawyer should be
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These omissions are indeed regrettable, particularly since they are seen
against the background of a book which has the merit of not avoiding difficult
questions. It is the originality and scope of the work that makes a reviewer
all the more demanding. Yet the occasional failure to meet these demands
does not detract from the conclusion that it is fortunate that such a work was
undertaken and realized. It does honor to those -who are connected with it as
well as to American criminal science in general.
MARC ANCELt
NOT since Beccaria published his Crimes and Punishments exactly two
hundred years ago has the conscience of the western world been so stirred
about the criminal law. The reasons, as might be expected, spring not from
our knowledge but from our uncertainties. Why are the children of our "best"
people delinquent? Can it be right, when we stigmatize war and genocide, to
take a fellow citizen's life under any circumstances? We also ask, with our
enfeebled graspi of property, with the mounting number of public welfare
offenses under regulatory statutes and administrative law, and with the aware-
-ness that rapid social change can turn wise provisions into absurdity, whether
most traditional crimes are not errors to be corrected, rather than affronts
to be punished.
On this last point, some have no doubts: they know: they are the large
body of psychiatrists and sociologists who have, as it were, dabbled in crime,
and whose voices are growing louder in the courts and public prints. Between
these experts, who know by science, and the public, which doubts from moral
scruple, there can be no real debate. But there is a third party, the practitioners
and theorists of the law, who are bound to bring their own expertness to
bear on the so far confused issues. They have, of course, been at work for
some years on a Model Penal Code. But it is also noteworthy that the last
year has seen the appearance of two important textbooks on the Criminal Law.
The first, by Monrad G. Paulsen and Sanford H. Kadish,l reflects the social
criticism of the law by interposing at relevant points some admirably concise
discussions of the issues raised by the political and behavioral scientists. But
the treatment of the main subject is classical in the sense that the law stays
in the foreground, well-ordered and intelligible as human institutions go.
The second textbook, by Richard C. Donnelly, Joseph Goldstein, and
Richard D. Schwartz, is built on a different plan. The forepart of its subtitle
suggests what this plan is: "Problems for Decision"; and the caption ends
tConseiller a la Cour de Cassatius de France; Director of Criminal Law Department
of the Institute of Comparative Law, University of Paris.
1. PAULSEN & KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES xiii, 1182 (1962).
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with, not the criminal law, but "a law of crimes." The authors, it is clear, wish
to throw tradition and principles back into the melting pot and begin again
as if we, they, their students, were contemplating de novo the promulgation
(this is their word, too) of a code. What should we then think about? learn?
bring to bear? The scheme is manifestly pedagogic - at least as modem
schooling understands pedagogy, which is a confronting of the young with
problems - preferably monumental - to exercise their wits and create,
through bewilderment, a bond with their teacher.
The "problem approach" is of course "scientific," and so are the contents
of the new text. It aims throughout at replacing, or perhaps it would be fairer
to say, enlarging, legal thought by the methods and deliverances of science.
The argument for doing this is not new. It goes back at least as far as the
great (though neglected) sociologist Cooley. In our day, Roscoe Pound, Karl
Lewellyn, and David Riesman have urged the desirability of treating legal
questions, both theoretical and practical, with the aid of empirical tests and
of the new knowledge gained by sociology, psychology, and anthropology. 2 And
only two years ago an interesting beginning was made by F. James Davis
and others under the title The Sociological Study of Law.
But the textbook under review goes much farther and takes the question
out of the realm of merely interesting ideas: in reading the book one has the
feeling of being tried under an alien code, of being questioned and sentenced
and paroled by officers, not of the law, but of the institutions that have grown
up in the market place to cope with the confusions of technology-personnel
managers, social workers, marriage counselors, and college admissions officers.
These are not of course present as such, but this is the impression given; and
it is sustained by the great variety and discontinuity of the reading matter.
The characteristic theme of the first chapter - to which I shall return - is
treated by taking the student from the facts of the Martin case, including the
pleading and sentencing, to newspaper letters, a report on children with atypical
sexual experience, a cognate case, a sociologist's view of homosexuality, the
decision of the Sentence Review Board, three cases suggestive of judicial
remorse, opinions on the treatment of the victims, a trial judge's view of
sentence review, and so on through half a dozen other extracts, all related
to the original "problem," which was: "Official and Unofficial Community
Responses" to "The Disturbing Event" of a homosexual doctor's practicing
his vocation and avocation together.
Such a textbook obviously requires a great deal of teaching. Most of the
views, reports, and cases are excerpted, and the fragments are short. Though
the sequence of ideas is clear enough from one subhead to the next, at the
end of a series the coherence is not always so plain. The authors moreover
believe what they profess about decision-making and therefore juxtapose
contrary views on the same point, without suggesting their own or a recon-
ciliation of disagreements. I have no doubt that a student who reads his assign-
2. THE SocIOLOGICAL STUDY OF LAW (F. J. Davis ed. 1962).
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ments faithfully will at the end of the year know a great deal about the con-
temporary disquiet concerning crime and punishment. How much criminal
law he will know is problematical. For in the first part of the book especially,
the reports of cases are few and the sociology of "the disturbing event" and
"response" are kept to the fore. In the second part, the differences between
civil and criminal law and the criteria of crime are discussed, but with an
admixture of "decisions" to be made about the need for a law of crimes and
the purposes of sanctions. Finally, in the third part, this same pair of questions
just cited is re-examined in the light of group interests - business, labor,
political parties. This last chapter is perhaps the best organized and certainly
the most "legal."
The contrast I draw between law on one side and science or sociology on
the other may seem arbitrary, not to say obscurantist. I remember arguing
the point several times with the late Judge Jerome Frank when he was a
fellow editor of The American Scholar. Neither of us managed to persuade
the other, though I think I felt in the end more sympathy with his legal
"realism" than he supposed. The fossilization of the law is always to be feared
and it can be corrected only by reconsidering it as simply one institution among
others. Social philosophy can then lead the chorus of critics. But to concede
this periodic necessity does not mean that the law is not also a very special
institution, with a characteristic mode of thought and a long history of peculiar
wisdom. And if this is true, then hybridization is as much to be feared as
fossilization, especially if the proposed partner in this mixing is science.
Nearly all the extracts from outside the law in the textbook before us
could serve to demonstrate the radical difference of outlook between science
and the law. To put this difference abstractly, the law has in view persons
while science deals with objects. It follows that in science inquiry knows no
restrictions - all available evidence must be brought to bear and exclusionary
rules are merely silly. Likewise, in dealing with nature all stratagems and
devices are permissible. But the law forbids this catch-as-catch-can. It does
not inquire by any and all means. Having no instruments, it understands the
fallibility and the impressionability of the human mind and it protects the
accused by limiting what shall come within the purview of judge and jury.
It does not even grant the accusers an unlimited right to question, for fear
that this right would establish a presumptive right to the desired answer.
Scientific investigation in the shape of the psychiatrist feels no such scruple.
In People v. Leyra,3 as Paulsen and Kadish tell us, the psychiatrist obtained
a confession after saying: "I want to see if I can help you" and repeating at
least forty times during the interview: "I'm your doctor." 4 Again and again
Donnelly, Goldstein and Schwartz, the "men of science" and the judges who
(as one of them says) "want to be advanced" disclose assumptions and beliefs
3. People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 99 N.E.2d 553, 556-57 (1951).
4. PAULSEN & KADISH, op. cit. supra nate 1, at 868.
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that violate not only the law, but also equity and common sense. One asserts
that a plea of guilty shows a contrite mind and deserves leniency. Another
believes that a delinquent youth who is not a slum child but has "had all the
advantages" is the more culpable. Still another wonders "whether sentencing
will ever become an exact science." In the murky purlieus of the Martin case
the question arises whether "scientific research" can be admitted as a defense.
Elsewhere, experts disagree on the figures of recidivism among sexual offend-
ers.
Still further on, a psychoanalyst explains that "the example of a criminal
has a stimulating effect on our own repressed impulses," because "before the
Superego was set up, our unbridled impulses kept us always in a state of
painful conflict with the world." Hence we want to punish crime so as to
keep down our impulses and reinforce the superego. By the side of this
"science," it is only fair to say, we have but little of what usually goes with it:
the polygraph, the truth serum, and the tape recorder. There is mention, how-
ever, of the "experiment" financed by the Ford Foundation to find out how
a jury works by secretly planting microphones in the room. And we are
given a glimpse of the ethics of social psychologists through an extract from
their code: "Only when a problem is significant and can be investigated in
no other way is the psychologist justified in giving misinformation to research
subjects or exposing research subjects to physical or emotional stress ...
The psychologist seriously considers the possible harmful after-effects and re-
moves them as soon as permitted by the design of the experiment." 5
The point of quoting is not to look askance at psychology, but to show that
its conduct is not that of the law. Consequently the infiltration of the law by
psychology does not promise a nearer approach to justice. This conclusion is
confirmed when, in keeping with its plan, our textbook devotes space to the
problem of individualizing punishment. Here science seems to give up its
detachment toward "research subjects" and to be hugging the person in a
warm, humane embrace. But the shift is deceptive. "Individualizing" necessarily
means getting all the facts, the background, the psychiatric reports, the testi-
monials of neighbors, employers, and friends, and out of this jumble framing
a clear idea of the convicted man's deserts. Even if this were a rational pos-
sibility, what has it to do with the law? The law with all its faults maintains
the ideal of treating comparable offenses in a comparable manner. Short of
divine omniscience - or Hamlet's impartial proffer of a whipping - who can
decide what a man's deserts are? As Mr. Justice Avory long ago remarked
about killing after provocation, if distinctions of character are to be made, the
bad-tempered man should get away with manslaughter, whereas the good-
tempered man will be charged with murder. This would not be justice, for
justice involves - as the scientific party refuses to admit - the law's pre-
dictability.
5. DONNELLY, GoL)sTEmn & SCHWARTZ at 85.
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The only rejoinder to this and other ancient principles is seldom made
openly: it is that justice can go hang. Justice implies responsibility which
implies free will which science cannot sanction. Most criminals, says the
empirical social worker, cannot help themselves; they are patients not offenders.
To save these patients from the criminal law, he invokes the social expediency
of restoring them to a useful life. But it should be noted that this therapeutic
doctrine still reserves for its cases the rights that the accused now enjoys
under the law. And this is fortunate for the patient, because social expediency
can work both ways: it can declare that for the good of the community the
sick, the halt, and the useless should be eliminated. And if by that time justice
has gone hang and the law courts have 'become the playground of psychiatrists
and electronic engineers, the individualizing of the punishment will not com-
fort, much less save, the individual.
Meanwhile it will be an excellent thing if the issue laid out by the new text-
book in our hands receives in the law schools of the country the discussion it
deserves. I am not sure how much "decision-making" can be elicited from
classes whose knowledge of the criminal law depends on what they can read,
quite literally, between the lines of Dr. Kinsey and Margart Mead and the
unreadable Professor Talcott Parsons. I am not even sure that the "problems"
elaborately set forth are not rather perennial difficulties and causes for debate.
But this will not matter to the recruits of a profession that respects the ad-
versary mode of reaching truth - the mode which protects our civil and
political rights, which governs our intellectual life, and which science itself
must adopt when rival theories dispute the field.
JAcQUES BARZUNt
tDean of Faculties and Provost of Columbia University; Seth Low Professor of History.
Mr. Barzun's publications include, among others, THE HousE OF INTELLECr. His next
book: ScrcE: THE GLoaious ENTERTAIN E T will be published in March.
ADDITIONAL ERRATA: Volume 72.
Page 1486, Line 29. For "transferor" read "transferee."
Page 1499, Line 7. For 'If' read "It."
Page 1501, Line 42. Delete "also be viewed as intangible property."
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